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MAKING SENSE OF DIVINE SIMPLICITY
Jeﬀ rey E. Brower
According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is an absolutely simple 
being lacking any distinct metaphysical parts, properties, or constituents. Al-
though this doctrine was once an essential part of traditional philosophical 
theology, it is now widely rejected as incoherent. In this paper, I develop 
an interpretation of the doctrine designed to resolve contemporary concerns 
about its coherence, as well as to show precisely what is required to make 
sense of divine simplicity.
Few tenets of classical theism strike contemporary philosophers as more 
perplexing or diﬃ  cult to comprehend than the doctrine of divine simplic-
ity—that is, the doctrine that God is an absolutely simple being, completely 
devoid of any sort of metaphysical complexity. This doctrine has its roots 
in antiquity, perhaps tracing ultimately to Parmenides, but it receives its 
most elaborate development and careful defense at the hands of philoso-
phers and theologians during the Middle Ages. According to the standard 
medieval understanding—as epitomized by Augustine, Anselm, and Aqui-
nas—the doctrine entails not only that God lacks the obvious forms of com-
plexity associated with the possession of material or temporal parts, but 
also that he lacks even the minimal form of complexity associated with the 
possession of distinct properties or att ributes. Thus, from the fact that God 
is divine, medieval thinkers infer that God is identical with his nature or 
divinity; from the fact that he is good, they infer that he is identical with his 
goodness; and so on in every other such case. And, of course, from the fact 
that God is identical with each of these things, they infer that each of them 
is identical with each of the others.
It is easy to see why contemporary philosophers fi nd the doctrine so 
diﬃ  cult. As stated, it seems to entail that God is identical with each of his 
properties—and, by implication, that each of his properties is identical 
with each of the others, and hence that God is himself a property. But that 
seems absurd. “The trouble with the idea” C. B. Martin once remarked 
“is just that it is hogwash.”1 Other philosophers have drawn the same 
conclusion, sometimes going a step further and claiming, with Quentin 
Smith, that the doctrine is not only “plainly self-contradictory” but actu-
ally “testifi es to the predominance of faith over intellectual coherence in 
some Christian circles.”2
Given the stature of the thinkers who have endorsed this doctrine histor-
ically, it is not surprising that a number of contemporary philosophers have 
come to its defense, arguing that divine simplicity is at least coherent, even 
if not ultimately acceptable.3 For all their ingenuity, however, contemporary 
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defenses of the doctrine continue to fall on deaf ears. My purpose in this 
paper is two-fold: to explain why this is case, and to mount a new defense, 
one that succeeds where the others have failed to resolve contemporary 
concerns about the doctrine’s coherence.
As will become clear when I discuss the doctrine below, there is nothing 
in divine simplicity itself that requires us to identify God with a property. 
On the contrary, the doctrine requires only that God is identical with the 
entities (such as God’s goodness, God’s power, and God’s wisdom) that are re-
quired to explain the truths expressed by true intrinsic predications of the 
form “God is F.”4 That is to say, the doctrine requires nothing more than 
the following:
(DS):  If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, then 
God’s F-ness exists and is identical with God.
But if this is all the doctrine requires, then the doctrine itself takes no stand 
on the precise nature of the entities with which it identifi es God. Hence 
the apparent absurdity that God is a property follows not from divine 
simplicity itself, but rather from its conjunction with something like the 
following “property account” of predication:
(PA):  If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s F-ness 
exists, where this entity is to be understood as a property.
Although contemporary defenders of divine simplicity oft en recognize 
that something like PA is at the root of contemporary diﬃ  culties with the 
doctrine, they are extremely reluctant to abandon it. Indeed, as we shall 
see, they almost always prefer to defend the claim that God is a property 
rather than develop an account of predication in terms of something other 
than properties. This explains, I think, the general failure of contemporary 
defenses of the doctrine: most accept some form of property interpretation 
(i.e., the conjunction of DS and PA), which certainly seems absurd; and 
those that don’t, fail to develop the sort of account of predication needed 
to render the doctrine coherent.
My own defense of simplicity is designed to pick up where these others 
leave oﬀ . It employs an alternative account of predication, one that makes 
crucial use of the notion of a truthmaker:
(TA):  If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s F-ness 
exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker for 
“a is F.”
Interpreted in light of TA, the doctrine of divine simplicity avoids the 
problems associated with the property interpretation. For so interpreted, 
the doctrine entails that God is identical with each of the truthmakers for 
the true (intrinsic) predications that can be made about him—indeed, that 
God himself is the truthmaker for each of these predications. But unlike the 
claim that God is a property, these claims seem perfectly coherent (at least 
on the assumption that truthmaker theory is itself coherent).5 Obviously, 
there is much in this interpretation, as well as the “truthmaker account” of 
predication underlying it, that requires explanation and defense. But I shall 
postpone that until later in the paper.6
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My discussion will proceed as follows. I begin in Section 1 with a brief 
account of the doctrine of divine simplicity, making clear why contempo-
rary philosophers fi nd it so natural to interpret it in terms of properties. In 
Section 2, I explain why, for all its att ractiveness, the property interpretation 
of simplicity should be rejected (at least given certain standard views about 
properties). I then turn, in Section 3, to the task of developing a satisfactory 
alternative. Here I begin by critiquing two alternative suggestions that have 
been made in the literature, before advancing my own preferred truth-
maker interpretation. Finally, I conclude my discussion, in Section 4, with 
a defense of the truthmaker interpretation, arguing that, in fact, it provides 
the only way of rendering the doctrine of divine simplicity coherent.
1. The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity
Most contemporary philosophers writing on divine simplicity take them-
selves to be working with the doctrine as understood by thinkers such as 
Augustine, Anselm, or Aquinas. It will be useful, therefore, to have before 
us a few of their characteristic statements of the doctrine. Here is a familiar 
passage from Augustine:
We speak of God in many ways—as great, good, wise, blessed, true, 
and whatever else does not seem unworthily said of him. Nonethe-
less, God is identical with his greatness, which is his wisdom (since 
he is not great by virtue of quantity, but by virtue of power); and he is 
identical with his goodness, which is his wisdom and his greatness; 
and he is identical with his truth, which is all of these things. For in 
him it is not one thing to be blessed and another to be great, or wise, 
or true, or to be good, or to be altogether himself. (De Trinitate 6.7.8)
Given Augustine’s enormous infl uence on the development of medieval 
philosophy, it is not surprising that similar passages pervade the works of 
Anselm and Aquinas. Consider, for example, the following passage from 
Anselm’s Proslogion:
Life, wisdom, and all the rest are not parts of you, but all are one, and 
each of them is the whole of what you are and the whole of what the 
others are. (Proslogion 18)
Again, here is a passage from Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles:
In every simple thing, its being and that which it is are the same. 
For if the one were not the other, simplicity would be removed. As 
we have shown, however, God is absolutely simple. Hence, in God, 
being good is not anything distinct from him; he is his goodness. 
(Summa Contra Gentiles, I 38)
As these passages help to make clear, the traditional doctrine of divine 
simplicity can be expressed in terms of the requirements it places on divine 
predications. At least as understood by the medievals, what this doctrine 
tells us is that if a predication such as “God is good” is true, then there 
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exists an entity, God’s goodness, that is identical with God; likewise, if “God 
is powerful” is true, then God’s power exists and is identical with God; and 
so on for other such true divine predications. Generalizing, therefore, we 
can (as I noted in the introduction) state the traditional doctrine of divine 
simplicity as follows:
(DS):  If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, then 
God’s F-ness exists and is identical with God.
Stated in this way, the doctrine seems to presuppose the existence of entities 
corresponding to abstract singular terms such as ‘God’s goodness,’ ‘God’s 
power,’ and ‘God’s wisdom.’7 So stated, therefore, the doctrine appears to 
be inconsistent with certain forms of nominalism—namely, all those which 
deny that expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ are genuinely referring de-
vices.8 Even so, it must be noted that, strictly speaking, the doctrine is silent 
about the nature of the entities referred to by these expressions. For it says 
nothing about the ontological category to which they belong. How, then, 
are we to understand such entities?
It is natural to suppose that the answer must be ‘as properties.’ Aft er all, 
Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas all suppose that, at least in the case of 
creatures, some true (intrinsic) predications of the form “a is F” entail the 
existence of properties, which can in turn be referred to by expressions of 
the form ‘a’s F-ness.’ To cite just one text as evidence, consider the following 
passage from Anselm’s Monologion in which he compares the justice of a 
human being to the justice of God.
A human being cannot be his justice, though he can have his justice. 
For the same reason, a just human being is not understood as being 
his justice (existens iustitia), but as having his justice. By contrast, it 
is not properly said that the supreme nature has its justice, but is 
its justice. Hence when the supreme nature is called just, is it prop-
erly understood as being its justice, rather than as having its justice.9 
(Monologion 16)
Here Anselm tells us that if an individual human being, say Socrates, is 
truly said to be just, this is because he exemplifi es justice, which is a property 
distinct from him. Evidently, therefore, Anselm takes the truth of creaturely 
predications such as “Socrates is just” to entail the existence of Socrates’ 
justice, where this entity is to be understood as a property. But if expres-
sions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ refer to properties in the case of creatures, why 
should they behave any diﬀ erently in the case of God? To the extent that 
medieval thinkers suppose that creaturely predications imply the existence 
of properties, therefore, it is natural to suppose they do so on the basis of 
a perfectly general account of predication (and abstract reference)—what I 
earlier called ‘the property account’:
(PA):  If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s F-ness 
exists, where this entity is to be understood as a property.
The plausibility of att ributing PA to the medievals is reinforced by the 
intuitive nature of PA itself. For this account just appears to make explicit 
something that, as contemporary philosophers, we oft en take for granted. 
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We habitually speak as if for any true predication whatsoever, there is a 
subject of predication (e.g., Socrates), there is a property (e.g., justice or 
Socrates’ justice), and the subject exemplifi es the property (e.g., Socrates 
is just).10
In light of the foregoing, there seems to be good reason initially to 
accept a property interpretation of divine simplicity—that is to say, one 
that combines the doctrine as stated at DS with the property account at 
PA. Of course, interpreting the doctrine in this way has the immediate 
consequence that God is identical with each of his properties, and hence 
is himself a property. But this consequence, as we shall see, is one that 
most contemporary defenders of simplicity are willing to accept.
2. Property Interpretations of Simplicity
Perhaps no one has done more to highlight the apparent absurdity of the 
property interpretation of divine simplicity than Alvin Plantinga. Indeed, 
ever since the publication of his 1980 monograph, Does God Have a Nature?, 
the literature on divine simplicity has been dominated by the question of 
whether it is coherent to say that God is identical with each of his (intrin-
sic) properties. As Plantinga points out, there are at least two reasons for 
thinking it is not:
In the fi rst place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then 
each of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that 
he has but one property. . . . In the second place, if God is identi-
cal with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a 
property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property. (Plantinga 
1980, p. 47)11
Although the fi rst consideration “seems fl atly incompatible with the obvi-
ous fact that God has several properties,” it is the diﬃ  culty raised by the 
second consideration that Plantinga regards as “truly monumental”:
No property could have created the world; no property could be 
omniscient, or indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property, 
then he isn’t a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowl-
edge, awareness, power, love or life. So taken, the simplicity doctrine 
seems to be an utt er mistake. (Plantinga 1980, p. 47)
It is hard to disagree with Plantinga’s conclusion here, at least on the as-
sumption that properties are abstract objects. For no such object could be a 
person, much less one responsible for the creation of the universe, capable 
of love, knowledge, power, awareness, and life.
2.1 Properties as Universals. I think it is fair to say that most philosophers 
writing about simplicity since Plantinga have assumed that the apparent 
absurdity of the doctrine derives entirely from the specifi c conception of 
properties in terms of which Plantinga interprets it. As is clear from the 
passages just quoted, Plantinga espouses a form of Platonic realism—that 
is, a conception of properties according to which they are a specifi c type 
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of abstract entity, namely, universals. Most defenders of simplicity would 
admit that this conception raises problems for the doctrine. But insofar as 
it represents only one of several respectable ways of conceiving of proper-
ties, they assume that these problems can be avoided merely by adopting 
some other conception of properties.
Although it would be possible to develop a version of the property 
interpretation in terms of some form of Aristotelian (as opposed to Pla-
tonic) realism—according to which properties are concrete (as opposed 
to abstract) universals—no one to my knowledge has att empted to do 
so. Nor is it hard to see why. The claim that God is a concrete universal 
seems just as problematic as the claim that he is an abstract universal. For 
by their very nature, universals are multiply exemplifi able entities—that 
is to say, entities capable of being exemplifi ed by more than one thing at 
a time; and concrete universals are typically regarded as constituents of 
the concrete particulars that possess them.12 Thus, interpreting simplicity 
in terms of concrete universals would have the consequence that God is 
both multiply exemplifi able and capable of serving as a constituent of 
other concrete particulars. But each of these consequences seems absurd. 
Certainly there are one-many relations in which God stands to concrete 
particulars; and we may, if we like, follow the neo-Platonists in speaking 
of such relations in terms of participation. But it doesn’t follow that God 
can literally be multiply exemplifi ed, for only universals can stand in 
that relation to particulars and no concrete particular is a universal.13 Nor 
would it seem plausible, at least on the classical conception of deity, to 
say that God is a constituent of anything else. For according to the classi-
cal conception, God is a transcendent being.14 Evidently, therefore, if we 
are going to defend the coherence of identifying God with a property, we 
must formulate a theory of properties according to which at least some 
properties are both concrete and individual.
2.2 Properties as Concrete Individuals. As far as I know the fi rst person 
in the contemporary literature to adopt a version of the properties-as-
concrete-individuals interpretation is William Mann (1982). Although 
his specifi c version of this interpretation faces seriously diﬃ  culties, it 
nonetheless suggests a general type of interpretation that can seem quite 
promising.
According to Mann, when medievals such as Aquinas identify God with 
his nature, his goodness, and his power, they do so with the intention of 
identifying God with what he calls property instances—that is, concrete indi-
viduals that stand in a special relation (namely, instantiation) to the Platonic 
universals of which they are the instances.15 As Mann sees it, therefore, we 
must distinguish between two very diﬀ erent kinds of property—abstract 
universals such as goodness, power, and wisdom, and concrete individ-
ual properties such as God’s goodness, God’s power, and God’s wisdom, 
which are instances of the corresponding universals.16 With this distinction 
in hand, he suggests that the medieval doctrine of simplicity requires the 
identifi cation of God with properties of only the latt er sort. Thus, if God 
and one of his creatures, such as Socrates, are both good, it will be true that 
they both stand in relation to the same universal, goodness. At the same 
time, however, it will also be true that they stand in this relation by virtue 
of possessing their own numerically distinct, concrete individual instances 
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of goodness—namely, God’s goodness in the case of God (which is identical 
with God), and Socrates’ goodness in the case of Socrates (which is distinct 
from him). But, of course, if this is correct, then the medieval doctrine can 
preserve the intuition that God is a concrete individual.
Although initially promising, the property-instance interpretation of 
simplicity must ultimately be rejected. As is oft en pointed out, one of the 
chief motivations historically for the doctrine of divine simplicity is divine 
aseity—that is, the view that God is an absolutely independent being, and 
hence exists entirely from himself (a se).17 But if God is a property instance, 
he will lack aseity. For property instances, at least as Mann conceives them, 
are dependent for their existence on the universals of which they are the 
instances. Thus, if God is identical with his goodness, even where his good-
ness is conceived as a property instance, God will depend for his existence 
on something distinct from himself, namely, the universal property of 
which his goodness is an instance, being good; and the same will be true for 
each of his other property instances.18
It might be thought that this objection could be avoided, and the 
properties-as-concrete-individuals interpretation upheld, if we simply 
denied the Platonic aspect of Mann’s view, and conceived of proper-
ties in terms of what are now standardly called ‘tropes.’ Like property 
instances, tropes are concrete individuals, but unlike them, they are not 
generally thought to require the existence of universals to explain their 
similarity or “sameness.” Thus, if it is asked in virtue of what two (or 
more) tropes of whiteness resemble each other, the answer will typi-
cally appeal to nothing more than the tropes themselves. Just in virtue 
of being the concrete individuals they are, they resemble each other with 
respect to color. End of story.19
Would a trope-theoretic version of the property interpretation fare 
any bett er than Mann’s property-instance interpretation?20 The answer, it 
seems to me, is ‘no.’ For although identifying God with a trope would 
avoid making him dependent on a universal (since according to most trope 
theorists, there are no universals), it would not succeed in making him 
absolutely independent. For even tropes, as they are usually conceived, 
are dependent beings—that is, concrete individuals depending for their 
existence on something distinct from themselves (namely, the subjects to 
which they belong). But, then, even if God is identifi ed with a trope, he 
will lack aseity. Of course, one could reject the usual conception of tropes, 
maintaining instead that tropes have a measure of independence—that 
they are (in A. J. Ayer’s memorable phrase) “junior substances.” But even 
if this proposal would resolve the worry about aseity, it would still face 
a serious diﬃ  culty—indeed it would face what I take to be the chief dif-
fi culty for any every version of the property interpretation. Regardless of 
how else they are conceived, tropes are properties. But, then, even if they 
are conceived of as independent beings, they will still be distinguished 
from substances proper—“senior substances”—insofar as properties can 
(whereas as concrete particular substances cannot) be exemplifi ed—i.e., 
possessed, instantiated, or had.
There is one fi nal step that the defender of the property interpretation 
could take—namely, to reject that properties in general, and tropes in par-
ticular, must be conceived of as entities capable of being exemplifi ed. At 
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one time I thought this was just the sort of response required to make 
sense of divine simplicity. But I am now convinced that it is mistaken—or 
at least misguided in the current dialectical context. For unlike the other 
features of properties we have been considering (abstractness, universality, 
and dependency), the capacity for being exemplifi ed is generally taken by 
critics of the doctrine to be constitutive of, and hence inseparable from, the 
concept of a property.21 Nor is it hard to see why. This conception of prop-
erties is precisely the one lying behind the traditional view that properties 
are entities categorially distinct from substances. According to the tradi-
tional view, both properties and substances may be the subject of further 
properties, and hence can both be said to exemplify other things. But only 
substances are such that they cannot be exemplifi ed by anything else.22
In light of the foregoing, we may state the fundamental diﬃ  culty for 
any version of the property interpretation succinctly as follows:
(1) God is a substance.
(2) No substance can be a property (i.e., an exemplifi able).
∴ (3) God cannot be identical with a property (no matt er how entities of 
this type are conceived).
The fi rst premise, I take it, is non-negotiable, since according to traditional 
theism, God is a person, and persons are substances.23 But the second prem-
ise would seem to be non-negotiable as well, since it seems to be central 
tenet of our very conception of properties that, whatever else they are, they 
are not substances.
2.3 Properties as Substances. As it turns out, however, a number of people 
have att empted to defend the property interpretation precisely by reject-
ing premise 2 of the argument above. Katherin Rogers (1996), for example, 
has suggested that even if there is a categorial divide between substances 
and certain types of properties, which she calls qualities or traits, there 
is no such division separating substances and what medievals such as 
Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas call actions—a special type of concrete 
individual that, at least in the case of creatures, inheres in or is exemplifi ed 
by substances.24 But, then, provided we identify God only with “actions” 
of this specifi c sort, a version of the property interpretation can be up-
held—or so Rogers’s discussion suggests.25
Again, Brian Left ow (1990) has presented an argument which suggests 
that the failure of the traditional conception of properties and substances, 
and hence the falsity of premise 2, is precisely the lesson to be drawn from 
the doctrine of divine simplicity. Suppose that divine simplicity does en-
tail that God is a property. Even so, Left ow argues, it does not follow (as 
Plantinga suggests) that God is an abstract object and hence not a person, 
even if (like Plantinga) we are initially inclined to accept a form of Platonic 
realism. If God is identical with a property P, then admitt edly it follows 
that there is only one thing where we might originally have thought there 
were two (namely, God and P). Again, this single thing must have all the 
characteristics that God really has and all the characteristics that P really 
has. But as Left ow rightly points out, these characteristics may constitute 
only a proper subset of those originally associated with God and P. Thus, if 
God is a substance and P is a property, it may turn out that some substances 
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(namely, God) are abstract entities capable of being exemplifi ed (in which 
case Plantinga’s conclusion would be right, God is not a person). But then 
again, it may also turn out that some properties (namely, P) are concrete 
particular substances and hence incapable of exemplifi cation (in which 
case there is no problem with saying that God is a person). For obvious 
reasons, proponents of the property interpretation may well opt for the 
latt er conclusion.26
By far the most explicit att empt to challenge the traditional conception 
of properties and substances occurs in William Vallicella’s (1992) treatment 
of divine simplicity. Vallicella grants that something is a property if and 
only if it can be exemplifi ed. He also grants that substances are such that 
they cannot be multiply exemplifi ed nor exemplifi ed by anything distinct 
from themselves. As he points out, however, the conjunction of these two 
claims is consistent with the view that substances are capable of being 
exemplifi ed by themselves, and hence of also qualifying as properties. Valli-
cella recommends, therefore, that we identify God with his properties and 
then construe God’s properties as entities that can be exemplifi ed only by 
themselves. Here again, the motivation is clearly to uphold a version of the 
property interpretation.27
As I see it, none of these discussions provides anything like compel-
ling grounds for abandoning the traditional conception of properties. For 
while they each recommend abandoning the conception, they oﬀ er us 
litt le in the way of independent motivation for doing so.28 Without some 
such motivation, however, the strategy they adopt for making sense of 
simplicity appears not only extreme, but also extremely ad hoc. Indeed, it 
would seem that any account of simplicity that could render the doctrine 
coherent without giving up the traditional conception of properties would 
be preferable to them.29
For all these reasons, I conclude that if we want to make sense of divine 
simplicity, our best hope is not to abandon the traditional conception of 
properties, but rather to abandon the att empt to interpret the doctrine in 
terms of properties at all.
3. Alternative Interpretations of Simplicity
Obviously, if we are going to avoid the diﬃ  culties associated with the prop-
erty interpretation, we must fi nd some alternative way of understanding 
locutions such as ‘God’s nature,’ ‘God’s goodness,’ and ‘God’s power’—
one according to which they refer something other than properties. But to 
what other type of entities can they plausibly be taken to refer?
There is very litt le discussion of this question in the contemporary 
literature. In fact, there appear to be only two suggestions that have been 
developed—namely, (a) that abstract singular terms refer to states of af-
fairs, and (b) that they refer to metaphysical constituents of particulars. 
Although neither suggestion is ultimately acceptable, both are worth 
exploring briefl y, since the reasons for their failure are instructive: they 
point the way not only to an adequate interpretation of simplicity, but 
also to the conditions that must be met by any adequate interpretation.
3.1 The State-of-aﬀ airs Interpretation. States of aﬀ airs provide what is, 
perhaps, the most obvious suggestion for a type of entity (other than 
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properties) that could serve as the referents for expressions of the form ‘a’s 
F-ness.’ Plantinga (1980), who seems to have been the fi rst to consider this 
suggestion in the context of simplicity, develops it as follows:
Suppose we consider Socrates and wisdom: we can distinguish 
Socrates from wisdom and each of them from the state of aﬀ airs 
Socrates’ being wise—a state of aﬀ airs that obtains or is actual if and 
only if Socrates displays wisdom. Perhaps we could refer to Socrates’ 
being wise by the locutions ‘Socrates’ having wisdom’ or ‘the wisdom 
of Socrates’ or even ‘Socrates’ wisdom.’ And when Aquinas speaks of 
God’s life or God’s wisdom, perhaps we may take him as speaking 
of the state of aﬀ airs consisting in God’s being wise and having life. 
(Plantinga 1980, p. 48)
In eﬀ ect, Plantinga is suggesting here that, instead of interpreting simplic-
ity in terms of a property account of predication and abstract reference, we 
interpret it in terms of a “state-of-aﬀ airs account” of such phenomena:
(SA):  If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s 
F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as a state of 
aﬀ airs.
There is one respect in which Plantinga claims the state-of-aﬀ airs inter-
pretation is clearly superior to any form of property interpretation. The 
state-of-aﬀ airs interpretation can (whereas the property interpretation 
cannot) immediately defl ect the diﬃ  culty of explaining how God’s good-
ness, power, wisdom, and so on can all be identical with one another. For 
as he says “while it is obviously absurd to claim that wisdom and power 
are the very same property, it is not obviously absurd to hold that God’s 
being wise is the same state of aﬀ airs as God’s being powerful.”30 Even so, 
Plantinga thinks, the state-of-aﬀ airs must ultimately be rejected. For states 
of aﬀ airs are abstract objects and hence no more capable than properties 
of creating the universe or possessing knowledge, awareness, power, love, 
or life.31 Again, states of aﬀ airs are essentially such as to obtain or fail to 
obtain, whereas substances (and in particular, persons) are not.
In response, it is tempting to adopt the strategy suggested earlier by 
Left ow (1990), noting that even if the identifi cation of God with a state of 
aﬀ airs might be taken to show that God is a certain type of abstract object, 
it might just as well be taken to show that certain states of aﬀ airs (such as 
God’s being wise or God’s being powerful) are concrete particular substances. 
Assuming we opt for the latt er conclusion, however, the objection would 
seem to be avoided.
Note, however, that adopting this line of response requires us to reject 
the view that there is any categorial diﬀ erence between states of aﬀ airs 
and substances—just as the earlier adoption of this strategy required us 
to reject the view that there is a categorial diﬀ erence between properties 
and substances. Those, like Plantinga, who start oﬀ  conceiving of states of 
aﬀ airs as abstracta will, no doubt, fi nd the rejection of this sort of dualism 
implausible—indeed, just as implausible as the rejection of that between 
properties and substances. Even so, there are resources for responding 
to this claim that weren’t available in the case of properties. For states 
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of aﬀ airs can, even if properties cannot, be conceived of in a way that is 
amenable to their identifi cation with substances. As is well known, David 
Armstrong has argued that the particulars of ordinary experience (what 
he calls “thick particulars”) are nothing but concrete states of aﬀ airs.32 
In doing so, he appears to be suggesting that we conceive of substances 
roughly along the lines of what other philosophers call facts, events, or 
property exemplifi cations. But there is nothing obviously absurd about iden-
tifying particular substances with entities of this sort (or at least we may 
assume this is true). But, then, what objection can there be to conceiving 
of God in this way as well?
The short answer is that such a conception of God confl icts with the 
standard understanding of divine simplicity. As we have seen, this under-
standing requires that God lacks any metaphysical parts, constituents, or 
complexity whatsoever. But concrete states of aﬀ airs, as they are typically 
conceived, are structured complexes having constituents.33 Thus, an ordi-
nary (thick) particular such as Socrates, on Armstrong’s view, is a structured 
complex whose constituents are a bare substratum (or “thin particular”) 
and various properties (namely, those that make up Socrates’ nature). But, 
then, evidently, an absolutely simple God cannot be identifi ed with a state 
of aﬀ airs of this sort.
Of course, one could always try to modify the standard concrete-state-of-
aﬀ airs conception in order to handle cases of simple substances. But even 
if successful, it would still seem that no state-of-aﬀ airs interpretation could 
succeed in rendering the doctrine of divine simplicity coherent. For this 
sort of interpretation is based on the general account of predication and ab-
stract reference at SA, which takes all expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ to 
refer to states of aﬀ airs. As we have seen, however, traditional proponents 
of divine simplicity—thinkers such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas—
all assume that, at least in the case of creatures, expressions of the form ‘a’s 
F-ness’ can refer to properties. Thus, ‘Socrates’ justice,’ they say, refers to a 
quality that is distinct from and exemplifi ed by Socrates. In order to make 
sense of this assumption, the defender of the state-of-aﬀ airs interpretation 
would have to allow that, at least in the case of creatures, states of aﬀ airs 
can be identifi ed with properties. But that seems absurd on any conception 
of states of aﬀ airs: no state of aﬀ airs, whether simple or complex, can be 
exemplifi ed, whereas properties are by nature exemplifi able.
This last criticism brings us to an important respect in which both the 
property and the state-of-aﬀ airs interpretations fail. As we can now see, 
both interpretations take for granted what might be called a ‘single-category 
account’ of predication and abstract reference—that is to say, an account ac-
cording to which the entities such as God’s justice and Socrates’ justice belong 
to a single ontological category. All versions of the property interpretation 
take for granted that such entities belong to the category of property, whereas 
all versions of the state-of-aﬀ airs interpretation take for granted they belong 
to the category of state of aﬀ airs. The problem, however, is that the doctrine 
of divine simplicity cannot be interpreted solely in terms of either prop-
erties or states of aﬀ airs—or indeed in terms of entities belonging to any 
single ontological category. As our earlier discussion of Augustine, Anselm, 
and Aquinas makes clear, the doctrine must be understood in terms of an 
account of predication and abstract reference that allows for expressions 
14 Faith and Philosophy
of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ to refer both to properties (as in the case of Socrates’ 
justice) and to concrete particular substances (as in the case of God’s justice). 
But no single-category account of predication can do that, since no single 
ontological category can include both substances and properties.
In the end, therefore, Plantinga appears to have been right—though 
not for the reasons he suggests—to suppose that the state-of-aﬀ airs inter-
pretation is just as unacceptable as the property interpretation. Indeed, 
summarizing our results to this point, we may say that no interpretation 
that presupposes a single-category account of predication can possibly be 
used to make sense of divine simplicity—regardless of whether the single 
category in question is taken to be property, state of aﬀ airs, or any other.
3.2 The Constituent Interpretation. If we want to avoid the problems associ-
ated with interpretations of simplicity that take for granted a single-category 
theory of predication, we must adopt a new account of predication—one 
that allows us to characterize the referents of abstract expressions in a way 
that is consistent with their belonging to diﬀ erent ontological categories (in 
particular, the categories of substance and property). But what must such an 
account look like? In answering this question, we can do no bett er than to 
start with an account suggested by Nicholas Wolterstorﬀ  (1991).
According to Wolterstorﬀ , contemporary diﬃ  culties with divine sim-
plicity all stem from the fact that we now approach the doctrine from the 
perspective of a theoretical framework that is foreign to the one in which 
it was traditionally understood. Although Wolterstorﬀ  doesn’t explicitly 
characterize the diﬀ erences in terms of what these frameworks say about 
predication and abstract reference, it is clear that this is how he’s thinking of 
them.34 Consider, for example, how he contrasts the two frameworks with 
respect to what each says about the possession of natures or essences:
It has become habitual for us twentieth-century philosophers, when 
thinking of essences, to think of things having essences, and to think of 
these essences as certain properties or sets of properties. An essence is 
thus for us an abstract entity. For a medieval, I suggest, an essence or 
nature was just as concrete [and individual] as that of which it is the 
nature. . . . Naturally the medieval will speak of something as having 
a certain nature. But the having here is to be understood as having as 
one of its constituents. Very much of the diﬀ erence between medieval 
and contemporary ontology hangs on these two diﬀ erent construals 
of “having.” Whereas for the medievals, having an essence was, having 
an essence as one of its constituents, for us, having an essence is, having 
an essence as one of its properties: exemplifying it. (Wolterstorﬀ  1991, 
pp. 541–42)
Wolterstorﬀ ’s point in the passage seems to be this: whereas contemporary 
philosophers conceive of predication in terms of subjects exemplifying 
properties, the medievals conceive of predication in terms of subjects 
possessing constituents. Thus, when contemporary philosophers speak 
of essences (or more generally, of the referents of abstract expressions 
of the form ‘a’s F-ness’), what they have in mind are abstract (universal) 
properties. By contrast, when the medievals speak of such entities, what 
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they have in mind are concrete (individual) constituents. As Wolterstorﬀ  
sees it, therefore, contemporary philosophers approach the doctrine of 
divine simplicity from the perspective of a property (or property-as-
universals) account of predication and abstract reference, whereas the 
medievals approach it from the perspective of what might be called ‘the 
constituent account’:
(CA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s 
F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as a meta-
physical constituent of a.
Wolterstorﬀ ’s diagnosis of contemporary diﬃ  culties with simplicity 
seems plausible in light of our earlier discussion. The property account 
at PA is, as I’ve suggested, at the root of most contemporary puzzlement 
over the doctrine. Moreover, his suggestion that the medievals interpret 
the doctrine in terms of CA (rather than PA) seems promising. For unlike 
all the other accounts we’ve considered, CA characterizes the referents 
of abstract expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ in terms of an ontological 
type—namely, constituent—whose further specifi cation can include both 
substances and properties. Thus, the view that results from interpreting 
simplicity in terms of CA—namely, that God is identical with each of his 
constituents, and hence has only one constituent, himself—seems perfectly 
coherent (at least if we allow for the notion of an “improper constituent,” 
on the model of an improper part in mereology). Note, too, that this view 
is consistent with the claim that expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ refer 
to properties in the case of creatures. For there is no obvious absurdity in 
saying that creatures have properties among their (proper) constituents, 
whereas God does not. Indeed, insofar as CA is neutral with regard to the 
nature of the entities introduced by expressions like ‘a’s justice,’ it clearly 
allows for a multiple-category theory of predication according to which, 
in some cases an expression of this sort refers to a property (namely, in the 
case of a creature such as Socrates), and in other cases it refers to a concrete 
individual (namely, in the case of God).
Of all the interpretations of divine simplicity currently on oﬀ er in 
the literature, Wolterstorﬀ ’s has done more, I suspect, than any other to 
convince people that the doctrine is coherent.35 Even so, it seems to me 
that there is a respect in which the theory of predication and abstract 
reference underlying it is unacceptably incomplete. For even if it makes 
sense to say that expressions such as ‘Socrates’ justice’ or ‘Socrates’ 
nature’ refer to metaphysical constituents of Socrates, CA gives us no 
principled basis for distinguishing these constituents. But that seems 
problematic. Aft er all, Socrates’ nature is not just any constituent of 
Socrates, but that constituent in virtue of which he is human; likewise, 
Socrates’ justice is not just any constituent of him, but that constituent in 
virtue of which he is just (as opposed to, say, human or powerful); and so 
on for the referents of every other such abstract expression. In general, 
we need a way of distinguishing these sorts of constituents, if only be-
cause in many cases they really are distinct. According to Aquinas, for 
example, the referents of ‘Socrates’ nature’ and ‘Socrates’ justice’ are not 
only distinct from each other but also distinct from Socrates. But it is 
hard to see how this can be explained unless we add something like the 
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following: although ‘Socrates’ nature’ and ‘Socrates’ justice’ both refer 
to constituents of Socrates, ‘Socrates’ nature’ refers to that constituent 
which makes him human, whereas ‘Socrates’ justice’ refers to that con-
stituent which makes him just.
Note that the same sort of problem arises in the case of God as well. 
For even if God is absolutely simple, and hence identical with each of 
his constituents, we can still draw a conceptual distinction between God’s 
nature and his justice or power (for surely expressions such as ‘God’s na-
ture,’ ‘God’s justice,’ and ‘God’s power’ are distinct in sense, even if not in 
reference). But here again, it seems that we can draw the relevant sort of 
distinction only if we characterize the constituents in question as follows: 
God’s nature is that constituent in virtue of which he is divine, and his justice 
and power, respectively, are those constituents in virtue of which he is just 
and powerful. But to describe God’s constituents in this way is already 
to invoke a further notion—namely, that of a truthmaker. For as already 
hinted at in the case of creatures, to say that a given entity is that in virtue 
of which something is F is just to say it is that which makes it F, or alterna-
tively, that which “makes it true” that it is F.
Evidently, therefore, in order to remove the incompleteness associated 
with Wolterstorﬀ ’s constituent account, we must revise CA along the fol-
lowing lines:
(CA*): If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s F-
ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as that (proper 
or improper) constituent of a which makes true “a is F.”
Once we revise the constituent account in this way, so as to make explicit 
reference to truthmakers, it becomes possible to distinguish (at least con-
ceptually) the referents of ‘Socrates’ nature’ and ‘Socrates’ justice,’ as well 
as the referents of ‘God’s nature’ and ‘God’s justice.’ For according to CA*, 
the referents of abstract expressions must identifi ed in relation to the pred-
ications they make true. But, then, wherever the predications are distinct, 
there will be grounds for at least a conceptual distinction of the referents.
As we have seen, a basis for this sort of distinction is just what was 
needed to remove the incompleteness associated with Wolterstorﬀ ’s constit-
uent interpretation of divine simplicity. Once it is introduced, however, his 
interpretation no longer seems objectionable. For now the claim that God 
is identical with his nature will just amount to the claim that he is identical 
with that constituent which makes him divine—i.e., with his divine-making 
constituent; again, the claim that he is identical with his justice will amount 
to the claim that he is identical with his just-making constituent; and so on 
for every other such theistic identity claim. Notice, moreover, that the inter-
pretation also enables us to make sense of the claim that God’s constituents 
are each identical with one another. For now to say this will just amount 
to saying that God’s divine-making constituent is identical with his good-
making constituent, and indeed that God has only one constituent, himself, 
that makes true each of the (intrinsic) predications that can be truly made 
about him.
Even without further comment, it should be clear that the revised con-
stituent interpretation goes considerable distance toward rendering the 
doctrine of divine simplicity coherent. It does not succumb to any of the 
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problems plaguing the other contemporary interpretations of simplicity. 
Nor is there is anything obviously absurd about saying that God is him-
self the truthmaker for each of the true (intrinsic) predications that can 
be made about him. I will have much more to say about the coherence 
of this sort of interpretation in the next section of the paper. Before I can 
do so, however, I need make clear that in moving from the original to the 
revised constituent interpretation of simplicity, we have in fact introduced 
a new type of interpretation—one whose acceptability has nothing to do 
with constituents.
3.3 The Truthmaker Interpretation. Although the revised constituent in-
terpretation makes reference to both constituents and truthmakers, it is, I 
now want to suggest, the notion of truthmaking (rather than constituency) 
that is really doing the important theoretical work. That this is the case is 
clear from the fact that the revised constituent interpretation at CA* can be 
re-stated without any reference to constituents whatsoever without any 
loss of plausibility. Thus, consider the following “truthmaker account” of 
predication and abstract reference:
(TA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s 
F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truth-
maker for “a is F.”
Clearly, what we have here is exactly like CA* except that it drops the 
requirement that truthmakers be constituents of any sort. Note, however, 
that when we interpret the doctrine of simplicity in terms of it, we arrive 
at the same view that makes the revised constituent interpretation seem 
so promising—namely, that God is identical with the truthmakers for each 
of his (intrinsic) predications. The only diﬀ erence is that we now arrive at 
this view directly, without any intermediate reference to constituents.
The fact that the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity can be ad-
equately stated without any reference to constituents (but not vice versa), 
confi rms that it is the notion of truthmaking (rather than constituency) that 
is crucial for interpreting the doctrine of simplicity. Indeed, it suggests 
that to the extent the revised constituent interpretation succeeds as an 
interpretation, it does so precisely because it is a species of the truthmaker 
interpretation. But if this is correct, there would appear to be no reason 
to appeal to constituents in the fi rst place, especially if one thinks, as I 
do, that it is the truthmaker account, rather than any form of constituent 
account, that represents the actual views of medievals such as Augustine, 
Anselm, and Aquinas on predication and abstract reference.36
We have now arrived at what I take to be the only type of interpreta-
tion that can succeed in making sense of divine simplicity—namely, the 
truthmaker interpretation. Of course, I have yet to say anything substantive 
about the notion of a truthmaker itself. The notion will already be familiar 
to many, insofar as it is a widely accepted part of much contemporary dis-
cussion in metaphysics. Even so, a few clarifi catory comments are in order.
Despite the misleading connotations suggested by its name, the notion of 
a truthmaker is not to be understood in terms of (eﬃ  cient) causality. On the 
contrary, it is to be understood in terms of broadly logical necessitation—as 
is evident from the fact that contemporary philosophers habitually speak 
of truthmakers as entailing the truth of certain statements or predications.37 
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Although this way of speaking strikes me as perfectly acceptable, it is some-
times objected to on the grounds that only truths (or truthbearers) can entail 
one another. To remove any possibility for misunderstanding, therefore, I 
oﬀ er the following (partial) analysis of truthmaker in its place:
(TM): If an entity E is a truthmaker for a predication P, then E is neces-
sarily (or essentially) such that P.38
In line with TM, we may speak of the relationship between a particular 
truthmaker and the predication it makes true in terms of necessitation 
rather than entailment. Here again, however, it must be kept in mind that 
the necessitation in question is not causal but broadly logical.
It is important to note that TM is intended to provide only a partial 
analysis of the notion of truthmaking. This point is important because a 
complete analysis of truthmaking in terms of entailment or necessitation 
would lead to obvious absurdities, including the absurdity that necessary 
truths—such as “2 + 2 = 4”—can have any existing thing whatsoever as 
their truthmakers. But if TM does not provide a complete analysis of the 
notion of truthmaking, the question arises as to what else is required for 
something to qualify as a truthmaker? This is a diﬃ  cult question, one to 
which diﬀ erent answers have been given in the literature. Some, such as 
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002), claim that the notion of a truthmaker is 
primitive, and hence does not admit of non-circular analysis or defi nition.39 
Others, however, att empt to defi ne truthmaker in terms of more familiar 
notions. Thus, Greg Restall (1996) suggests that we can defi ne truthmaking 
in terms of the notion of non-classical or “relevant” entailment.40 Again, 
Barry Smith (1999 and 2002) claims that we can defi ne it in terms of rep-
resentation or projection, a notion that he describes as the dual of necessi-
tation.41 Although I myself prefer the primitive truthmaking account, we 
needn’t decide here among the competing views. For our purposes, it will 
suﬃ  ce merely to adopt the following principle: if an entity E necessitates 
the truth of a predication P, then E is at least a candidate—perhaps even a 
prima facie good candidate—for P’s truthmaker.
It should be clear, in light of the foregoing, that to characterize an en-
tity as a truthmaker is to characterize it in terms of a certain metaphysical 
function or role—that of necessitating (in a certain way) the truth of the 
predications it makes true. In this respect, ‘truthmaker’ is similar to other 
sorts of functional characterization one fi nds in philosophy. Just as func-
tional characterizations in the philosophy of mind, for example, enable us 
to prescind from the precise nature of mental states (such as pain), so too 
the characterization of an entity as a truthmaker enables us to prescind 
from the precise ontological category to which it belongs.
All of this is, of course, directly relevant to the doctrine of divine sim-
plicity. For as we’ve seen, insofar as the doctrine requires us to identify God 
with his nature, goodness, power, justice, and so on, it must be interpreted 
in light of a theory of predication and abstract reference that permits the 
referents of abstract expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ to refer to entities 
belonging to the category of substance (namely, God himself). Given what 
we have said about truthmakers, however, we can see that TA is just such 
a theory. In taking the referents of abstract expressions to be truthmakers, 
it places no restriction whatsoever on the nature or ontological category to 
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which they belong. For the same reason, the referents of such expressions 
can, at least in principle, be identifi ed not only with concrete particulars in 
the case of God, but also with properties in the case of creatures.
4. The Truthmaker Interpretation Defended
If my argument to this point has been successful, it will be clear that the 
truthmaker interpretation of simplicity provides us with an account of 
the doctrine that is prima facie coherent. In this fi nal section, I complete 
my defense of the truthmaker interpretation by responding to some of 
the most obvious and worrisome objections it faces. I then conclude by 
arguing that, in addition to being coherent, the truthmaker interpretation 
provides us with the only coherent interpretation of simplicity.
4.1 The Truthmaker Interpretation and Contingency. According to the truth-
maker interpretation, God is identical with the truthmakers for each of the 
true (intrinsic) predications that can be made about him. Thus, if God is 
divine, he is identical with that which makes him divine; if he is good, 
he is identical with that which makes him good; and so on in every other 
such case. Now, since nothing can be regarded as identical with anything 
other than itself, this interpretation just amounts to the claim that God is 
the truthmaker for each of the predications in question.
This interpretation of simplicity seems promising if we focus on predi-
cations such as “God is divine,” “God is good,” and “God is powerful.” 
For in each of these cases, God can plausibly be regarded as their truth-
maker. According to classical theism, God is essentially divine, good, and 
powerful. That is to say, he is divine, good, and powerful in all possible 
worlds in which he exists, and hence is such as to necessitate the truth 
of the corresponding predications. But this, as we have seen, is all that’s 
required to make him a candidate for their truthmaker.
A problem arises, however, when we turn our att ention to predications 
like “God knows that human beings exist” or “God chooses to create the 
universe.” These predications certainly appear to be intrinsic. According 
to the truthmaker interpretation, therefore, God must be their truthmaker. 
But do we really want to say that? To do so would require our also saying 
that God alone is suﬃ  cient for their truth, and hence that the truths them-
selves are cases of essential predication—which, in turn, entails that God 
could not have failed to know or will the things he actually knows or will. 
Such a conclusion will no doubt strike many theists as absurd.
There are two things to be said in response to this objection. The fi rst 
is that, it is not at all clear that the objection goes through. Granted, if 
we assume that predications like “God knows that human beings exist” 
or “God chooses to create the universe” are genuinely intrinsic, then the 
truthmaker interpretation will give us no choice but to say that they are 
also essential. It is possible, however, to resist this assumption, and to ar-
gue instead that such predications are really cases of contingent, extrinsic 
predication.42 Indeed, this strategy seems to me not only plausible, but 
also the one adopted by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas.43
The second thing to be said, however, is that strictly speaking, this 
objection concerns the plausibility not the coherence of divine simplicity. 
There is nothing internally inconsistent—and so nothing absurd in that 
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sense—about saying that God could not have known or willed otherwise 
than he actually knows or wills. On the contrary, this view seems perfectly 
intelligible, and has in fact been defended by a number of classical theists 
(including perhaps each of the following: Plato, Plotinus, Abelard, and 
Leibniz). No doubt, the view will strike many theists as “absurd” insofar 
as it confl icts with other things they take themselves to know about God. 
But that is just another way of saying it will strike them as highly implau-
sible. Strictly speaking, therefore, even if the objection goes through, it 
doesn’t threaten the basic project that I’ve undertaken here, which is that 
of making sense of divine simplicity. While I do hope that what I have to 
say will help to shift  contemporary discussion of the doctrine away from 
questions about its coherence to questions about its plausibility, my cen-
tral aim here is to defend its coherence.
4.2 The Truthmaker Interpretation and Abstract Reference. There are no 
doubt a number of other objections that might be raised against the truth-
maker interpretation and more properly concern its coherence. Here I 
want to focus on just two, both of which concern TA, the account of predi-
cation and abstract reference underlying it.
Objection 1: I have claimed that TA is a categorially neutral account of 
predication and abstract reference, and hence that in principle it places 
no restriction on the nature of the referents of expressions of the form 
‘a’s F-ness.’ Moreover, I have argued that these referents can be plausi-
bly identifi ed with concrete particular substances—indeed, God him-
self—in the case of God. But is it really possible to say that the referents 
of such expressions can also be identifi ed with properties in the case of 
creatures, as the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity requires?
Yes, provided we have the right metaphysical account of properties. What 
makes it possible—indeed, plausible—to say (e.g.) that ‘God’s justice’ refers 
to God himself is that the referent of this expression, on TA, is the truth-
maker of an essential predication, “God is just.” Notice, however, that in the 
case of creatures, the same sort of expression, (e.g.) ‘Socrates’ justice,’ will 
typically refer to the truthmaker of an accidental or contingent predication. 
For the same reason, we cannot typically say in this sort of case that the 
referent of the expression is a concrete individual. Socrates, for example, 
cannot be regarded as the truthmaker for “Socrates is just,” since he does 
not even necessitate its truth—or so it would seem. But then what is the 
truthmaker in such cases?
As it turns out, there is more than one way to answer this question. David 
Armstrong, for example, has argued that the truthmakers for contingent 
predications must be regarded as facts (or concrete states of aﬀ airs).44 On 
this view, the referent for an expression such as ‘Socrates’ justice,’ under-
stood as a device for picking out the truthmaker of “Socrates is just,” will 
be the fact that Socrates is wise. Obviously this answer will be of no use if we 
want properties to be the referents of such expressions. But this is not the 
only answer that can be given. One can also argue, as C. B. Martin does, that 
the truthmakers for contingent predications are non-transferable tropes—
that is, concrete individual properties that are essentially dependent on the 
subjects of which they are the properties.45 This sort of trope nominalism 
seems to me to represent the view of properties most commonly endorsed 
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by medieval philosophers.46 If I am right about this, however, then the refer-
ent of ‘Socrates’ justice’ can be identifi ed with a property—one such that, in 
all possible worlds in which it exists, Socrates exists and is just—despite the 
fact that ‘God’s justice’ must be identifi ed with a concrete particular (namely, 
God himself).47
Objection 2: Even if it is true in principle, on TA, that expressions of the 
form ‘a’s F-ness’ can be taken to refer to entities in diﬀ erent ontological 
categories (including properties and concrete particulars), it might still 
seem deeply problematic, if not absurd, that divine simplicity requires 
specifi c instances of this type of expression, say ‘a’s justice,’ to refer 
to entities of such radically diﬀ erent kinds as non-transferable tropes 
in one context (namely, ‘Socrates’ justice’), and concrete particulars in 
another (namely, ‘God’s justice’). Aft er all, predications of the form “a 
is just” seem to have the same basic meaning regardless of whether ‘a’ 
refers to Socrates or to God.
There are three things to be said in response to this objection. First, it must 
be emphasized that from the perspective of the truthmaker account, the 
form or syntactical type of an expression such as ‘a’s justice’ is irrelevant 
to the specifi c ontological category of its referent. According to TA, an 
expression such as ‘a’s justice’ is an expression derived from a nominal-
ization of a simple predication of the form ‘a is F.’ As such it is, as it were, 
a kind of technical term whose referential properties must understood in 
terms of its relation to the predication from which it derives: it just refers 
to whatever makes true its corresponding predications (in this case, ‘a 
is just’). In principle, therefore, there is nothing about the expression’s 
form or syntactical type which rules out the possibility of its referring to 
accidental properties or tropes in one case, and to concrete particulars in 
another—provided, of course, that both of these types of entity can plau-
sibly be regarded as playing the role of truthmaker of the relevant type 
of predication.48
The second thing to be said is that there are examples, deriving from the 
broadly medieval metaphysical framework in which the doctrine of divine 
simplicity is formulated, which lend support to the idea that an expression 
of a single syntactical type could refer to both accidental tropes and con-
crete particulars. To take just one such example, suppose we have a kett le 
of hot water boiling over an open fi re. In that case, each of the following 
predications will be true:
(4) The water is hot.
(5) The fi re is hot.
Now provided that we are willing to grant the possibility that both fi re 
and water are substances, as the medievals themselves do, then claim 
4 may be regarded as a case of accidental predication, and hence as re-
quiring an accidental trope for its truthmaker, whereas claim 5 may be 
regarded as a case of essential predication, and hence as requiring only 
a particular substance, the fi re, for its truthmaker. But, then, if we follow 
TA in inventing abstract nominalizations for their truthmakers, then in 
the case of claims 4 and 5 we will end up with expressions of a single 
syntactical type, namely, ‘a’s heat,’ which will refer to entities in both the 
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relevant ontological categories. Moreover, since these entities play the 
same functional role—that of explaining why something is hot—despite 
their being of diﬀ erent categories, they are rightly said to belong to the 
same (functional) kind, heat, and hence to serve as the referents for the 
same type of expression.
The third and fi nal thing to be said is that, if we help ourselves to 
one further aspect of the medieval metaphysical framework mentioned 
above—in particular, a substantive conception of metaphysical kinds 
standardly adopted by medieval philosophers—we can see why, even 
in the case of God and creatures, it might seem utt erly unproblematic 
for expressions of the same syntactic type (e.g., ‘a’s justice’) to refer to 
both accidental properties and concrete individual substances. Accord-
ing to Aquinas, for example, metaphysical kinds are to be understood in 
broadly functional terms: things belong to the metaphysical kinds they 
do in virtue of possessing certain powers or capacities (namely, those that 
are defi nitive of their kind). In fact, a thing’s nature, as he understands it, 
just is that which grounds its kind-defi ning powers or capacities.49 Now 
in the case of a creature such as Socrates, whose justice can clearly wax 
and wane, it is one thing to be human, and another thing to be just. Thus, 
Socrates cannot be just solely in virtue of possessing human nature (and 
hence the distinctive capacities defi nitive of the metaphysical kind human 
being). On the contrary, in order for him to be just, he must come to actual-
ize certain features of his distinctively human capacities, which will in-
volve the acquisition of certain contingent properties or non-transferable 
tropes—say, knowledge and virtue. In the case of God, by contrast, things 
are diﬀ erent. For unlike humanity, God’s nature, as Aquinas sees it, is 
such that its very possession necessitates the actualization of the capaci-
ties specifi c to it—which include the capacities for being perfectly just, 
powerful, good, knowledgeable, wise, and so on. Hence, solely in virtue 
of possessing his nature, God will not only be just, but also omnipotent, 
omniscient, perfectly just, wise, and so on.50
In the end, therefore, there appears to nothing incoherent about saying 
that both God and creatures are just, despite the fact that God is identical 
with his justice, whereas creatures are distinct from and only accidentally 
related to theirs. No doubt, there are other objections that could be raised 
to the truthmaker account, and hence to the interpretation of simplicity 
that relies on it. But since these are, at least as far as I can tell, the most 
powerful and obvious ones—apart from those that can be raised against 
truthmaker theory itself, whose coherence I am taking for granted in this 
paper51—I conclude that the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity is not 
only coherent, but even plausible in certain respects.
4.3 The Only Coherent Interpretation? I have now completed my defense 
of the truthmaker interpretation of divine simplicity. Before concluding, 
however, I want to indicate briefl y why, in addition to making sense of the 
doctrine, the interpretation that I have defended also seems to oﬀ er the 
only possible way of rendering it intelligible.
All the interpretations of simplicity that we have examined other than 
the truthmaker interpretation fail because they rely on the wrong account 
of predication and abstract reference. From the failure of the property and 
states-of-aﬀ airs interpretations we learn that the traditional doctrine of 
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divine simplicity cannot be made sense of apart from a categorially neu-
tral account of predication and abstract reference. From the failure of the 
constituent interpretation, however, we learn that category neutrality is 
not suﬃ  cient to make sense of the doctrine. What is needed is an account 
that is both thin enough to preserve the categorial neutrality of referents of 
expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness,’ while at the same time thick enough to 
enable us to distinguish such referents when they are either in fact distinct 
(as in the case of Socrates’ nature and Socrates’ goodness) or merely conceptu-
ally distinct (as in the case of God’s nature and God’s goodness). That is to say, 
what is needed is a general theory of predication and abstract reference 
that meets each of the following conditions:
(C1):  True (intrinsic) predications of the form “a is F” guarantee the 
existence of entities (such as God’s justice or Socrates’ justice) 
that can be referred to by abstract expressions of the form ‘a’s 
F-ness.’
(C2):  The entities referred to by such expressions are of a type whose 
instances can plausibly be both (i) identifi ed with concrete par-
ticular substances (as in the case of God’s justice) and properties 
(as in the case of Socrates’ justice); and (ii) distinguished (at least 
conceptually) from one another.
Truthmakers, however, appear to be the only type of entity that obviously 
meets both of these conditions. We can, if we choose, appeal to such enti-
ties directly, as in the case of the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity, or 
we can appeal to them indirectly, as in the case of the revised constituent 
interpretation. But either way, it appears that we have no choice but to 
appeal to them.
I conclude, therefore, that the truthmaker interpretation is not only 
suﬃ  cient for making sense of divine simplicity, but also necessary. Those 
who remain unconvinced may take the arguments of this paper as a 
challenge either to identify the source of incoherence in the truthmaker 
interpretation, or to provide a counterexample to my claim that it is the 
only coherent interpretation of simplicity that can be given.
4.4 Conclusion. In this paper, I have argued that the doctrine of divine 
simplicity makes sense if—and apparently only if—we are prepared to 
interpret it in terms of a truthmaker account of predication. For only inter-
preted in this way can it meet C1 and C2, the two conditions necessary for 
any coherent interpretation of simplicity. I have also argued, however, that 
once we interpret the doctrine in terms of a truthmaker account, it turns 
out to be not only coherent, but also plausible in certain respects.
If my arguments have been successful, we have, at long last, a way of 
resolving the chief contemporary diﬃ  culty with divine simplicity. Indeed, 
if I am right, this diﬃ  culty does not trace (as Wolterstorﬀ ’s interpretation 
suggests) to any fundamental disagreement about whether properties 
are constituents, but rather traces (as mine suggests) to a fundamental 
disagreement about the ontological commitments of predication and ab-
stract reference. Thus, if contemporary philosophers want to understand 
the doctrine of divine simplicity, they need only enter imaginatively into 
that theoretical account according to which the entities required for the 
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truth of predications and for the referents of their corresponding abstract 
expressions are truthmakers. However, once we have entered this frame-
work—and I don’t think this requires too much imagination, given the 
central role that truthmaking plays in much contemporary metaphysics—
it turns out that we are in a position not only to appreciate the coherence 
of the doctrine of divine simplicity, but also a good bit of medieval meta-
physics and philosophy of language as well.52
Purdue University
NOTES
1. Martin 1976, p. 40.
2. Smith 1988, p. 524, n. 3. The locus classicus for contemporary diﬃ  culties 
is Plantinga 1980. There are, however, a number of works that have contribut-
ed in important ways to the contemporary understanding of these diﬃ  culties, 
including each of the following: Mann 1982, 1983; Morris 1985; and Stump 
and Kretzmann 1985. For some of the earliest contemporary discussions of 
simplicity, see Bennet 1969; Ross 1969; Martin 1976; LaCroix 1977 and 1979; 
and Wainwright 1979.
3. More oft en than not, contemporary philosophers have come to the de-
fense of Aquinas’s understanding of simplicity. Cf., e.g., Davies 1987; Dewan 
1989; Kretzmann 1983; Lamont 1997; Stump 2003; and Stump and Kretzmann 
1985.
4. For convenience, I will oft en speak of “true intrinsic predications” as 
shorthand for the more cumbersome (and also more accurate) phrase “the 
truths expressed by true intrinsic predications.” I focus on intrinsic predications 
throughout, since no medieval ever thought that divine simplicity requires 
God to be identical with entities (if there are any) such as being thought about 
by me, which are introduced by purely extrinsic predications. Moreover, I rely 
on an intuitive notion of intrinsic predication according to which such predi-
cations are those which characterize things “in virtue of the way things them-
selves are.” So understood, the notion must be distinguished both from that 
of essential and from that of non-relational predication, since intrinsic pred-
ications can be either contingent (e.g., “Socrates is wise”) or relational (e.g., 
“Socrates has parts”).
5. In what follows I assume the coherence of truthmaker theory, as it is 
understood by some of its most prominent defenders (more on this in §§3–4 
below). Those who reject this assumption may take the conclusion of my argu-
ment to have the form of a bi-conditional—namely, that divine simplicity is 
coherent if and only if truthmaker theory (so understood) is.
6. For a brief, independent development of the truthmaker interpreta-
tion, see Oppy 2003. For some nascent expressions of the basic idea behind it, 
see Left ow 1984 (esp. pp. 51–52, 57) and Ross 1985 (esp. p. 384).
7. Terms such as these are called ‘abstract singular terms’ because they 
are the abstract counterparts of concrete terms such as ‘good,’ ‘powerful,’ and 
‘wise’ and are grammatically singular in number.
8. This is not to deny, of course, that the doctrine could be restated so as 
to be perfectly consistent with all forms of nominalism. But I shall concern 
myself in what follows only with the traditional statement of the doctrine, 
which is the one lying behind contemporary worries about its coherence.
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9. The possessive pronouns do not explicitly occur in the Latin, but I 
think they are implicit here (as they oft en are in Latin). I have discussed the 
theory of properties underlying Anselm’s discussion here (and elsewhere) in 
Brower 2004.
10.  Those who think of properties as universals might fi nd it odd that PA 
introduces properties using expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ rather than ‘F-
ness’ (especially since expressions of the former sort are now standardly used 
to refer to particular properties or tropes). As stated, however, PA is intended 
to be neutral as regards the specifi c nature of the properties to which it refers, 
and hence to leave open the question of whether they are universal or par-
ticular. If Socrates and Plato are both human, PA tells us that they each have 
the property of humanity. Strictly speaking, however, it takes no stand on the 
question of whether Socrates’ humanity is identical with Plato’s.
11. For important discussion of both diﬃ  culties in the literature, see For-
rest 1996; Hughes 1989; Mann 1986; Stump and Kretzmann 1985; and Wolter-
storﬀ  1991.
12. For a defense of the concrete conception of properties, also common-
ly referred to as ‘immanent realism,’ see Armstrong 1978, vol. 2, chap. 3 and 
Armstrong 1997, chaps. 3–4.
13. When the neo-Platonists (or, for that matt er, philosophers such as 
Aquinas) speak of creatures as participating in God, they don’t really mean to 
suggest that God is exemplifi ed by creatures, and hence is a universal. On the 
contrary, they typically mean that creatures are resemblances of, and beings 
causally dependent on, God. For discussion of this conception of participa-
tion, as well as the att ribution of it to Plato himself, see Allen 1960.
14. Cf. Aquinas’s discussion of this issue in Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 8, a. 1.
15. Mann 1982; cf. Mann 1983.
16. Mann doesn’t speak of property instances as properties, since he re-
serves the latt er term for universals. Still, it’s clear from his discussion that he’s 
thinking of them along the lines of what philosophers nowadays call particu-
lar properties or tropes. Cf. esp. 1982, p. 466.
17. See Bergmann and Brower 2006; Brower forthcoming; Immink 1987; 
Jordan 1983, esp. pp. 176–79; Left ow 1990, pp. 584–92; and Plantinga 1980, pp. 
28–37.
18. Morris (1985) criticizes Mann on these grounds, as does Wolterstorﬀ  
(1991) and Vallicella (1992).
19. For discussion of trope nominalism, see Armstrong 1989; Campbell 
1980 and 1990; and, Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984.
20. Interestingly, in later work, Mann (1986, pp. 343–53) explicitly considers 
the aseity objection as well as the trope-nominalistic reply, though even here he 
does not adopt it. Like so many other defenders of simplicity, he is simply un-
willing in the end to abandon Platonic realism altogether, and hence tries to re-
but the objection from within a realist framework. For discussion of Mann’s reply 
here, as well as the new problems it raises, see Wolterstorﬀ  1991, pp. 538–40.
21. Or at least to be constitutive of, and inseparable from, the concept of a 
basic or fundamental property. This qualifi cation is needed because many phi-
losophers want to admit the existence of unexemplifi able properties such as 
being red and not being red. As Chris Swoyer (2000, §1) points out, however, 
“even they typically believe that such properties are intimately related to oth-
er [more basic or fundamental] properties (here being red and not being red) that 
can be exemplifi ed.”
22. For further discussion and defense of the traditional view, see Oliver 
1996 and Swoyer 2000.
23. As indicated earlier (in note 13), this premise is not violated by neo-
Platonic conceptions of God, according to which God is that in which all 
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things participate. Nor, would I argue, is it violated by the traditional insis-
tence that God is not a substance or person in exactly the same sense we are.
24. As this description makes clear, such “actions” are not to be confused 
with events as contemporary philosophers conceive of them.
25. See Rogers 1996, esp. pp. 170–72. Rogers would not accept my descrip-
tion of her view, for she denies that the term ‘property’ can be applied to what 
the medievals call actions on the grounds that actions are done or performed, 
whereas properties (i.e., qualities or traits) are possessed. This restriction on the 
scope of the application of the term, however, seems artifi cial and even mislead-
ing in the context of the medieval philosophical tradition that she claims to be 
representing. For as indicated in the text itself, when the medievals speak of 
actions (actiones), what they have in mind are concrete individuals inhering in 
or belonging to particulars—which, of course, is why they follow Aristotle in 
identifying actions (or at least creaturely actions) as one of the nine categories of 
accidents (i.e., accidental properties). For a representative medieval discussion 
of actions, see Aquinas’s Sententia super Physicam III, lect. 5.
26. See Left ow 1990, pp. 593–94.
27. See Vallicella 1992, esp. pp. 512–19.
28. Left ow (1990, 582–83) actually oﬀ ers positive arguments for the truth 
of divine simplicity. But even if these arguments compelling, they don’t re-
quire us to reject the traditional conception of properties as exemplifi ables. 
For as we have seen, there is nothing in the doctrine of divine simplicity itself 
(as stated at DS) that requires the identifi cation of God with a property.
29. In saying all this, I don’t mean to suggest that the traditional concep-
tion of properties is unassailable. There are, aft er all, a number of contexts 
in which philosophers habitually conceive of properties in ways that don’t 
involve the notion of exemplifi ability—namely, as sets of possibilia or functions 
from possible worlds to sets of possibilia. My own view is that the “proper-
ties” appealed to by these alternative conceptions are not genuine properties 
at all, but rather entities introduced to model some of the functional roles that 
genuine properties play. But even if I am wrong about this, these alternative 
conceptions are not the ones taken for granted in the context of simplicity. 
And even if they were, they would be of no use in responding to the objection 
that God is a property. On the contrary, they would simply raise the objection 
in a diﬀ erent form. For saying that God is a set or function seems just as ab-
surd as saying that God is an exemplifi able.
30. Plantinga 1980, p. 49.
31. Plantinga 1980, p. 52.
32. Cf. Armstrong 1997; for the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ par-
ticulars, see pp. 123–26. Gustav Bergmann held a similar conception of particu-
lars. Cf. Wolterstorﬀ  1970 for references and discussion.
33. Cf. again Armstrong 1997.
34. Wolterstorﬀ  speaks, at various points in his article, of the need for ‘a 
theory of predication’ in connection with divine simplicity, but what he means 
by this is a theory about the semantics of predication—one that will explain 
how a multiplicity of predicates with distinct senses or meanings can be predi-
cated of a simple God. When I speak of the need for a theory of predication, 
however, what I have in mind is theory about the metaphysics of predication—
one that explains the nature of the entities required both for the truth of predi-
cation and for the referents of abstract singular terms.
35. Cf., e.g., the approving remarks in Freddoso 2002, pp. xxxiv–xxxv.
36. The suggestion that the medievals accept a truthmaker theory of predi-
cation is not original to me, but is explicitly defended in Fox 1987.
37. See, e.g., Armstrong 1997, p. 13; Bigelow 1998, p. 125.
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38. Cf. Bigelow 1988, p. 126; Fox 1987, p. 188; Oliver 1996, p. 69; and Ro-
drigue-Pereyra 2002.
39. Thus, according to Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, 34), the best we can do is 
to say that an entity E is a truthmaker for a predication P if and only if E is an 
entity in virtue of which P is true, and then illustrate what we mean by ‘being 
true in virtue of’ with examples.
40. According to Restall (1996, 339), an entity E is a truthmaker for a predi-
cation P if and only if E really entails (or is really necessarily such) that P, where 
he suggests that ‘real entailment (or necessity)’ is to be understood along the 
lines of Anderson and Belnap’s notion of relevant entailment. Rather surpris-
ingly, however, when Restall actually states his account of real entailment, he 
explicitly defi nes it in terms of truthmakers: A really entails B, he says, if and 
only if, in every world W, every truthmaker for A is a truthmaker for B. Obvi-
ously, this account of non-classical entailment won’t do as a reductive analysis 
of the notion of truthmaking.
41. Smith’s defi nition of truthmaking can be characterized succinctly as 
follows (cf. Smith 2002, p. 232): an entity E is a truthmaker for a predication 
P if and only if E is necessarily such that it is a part of the total projection of 
P, where ‘the total projection of P’ is to be understood as ‘the sum of all those 
entities projected by P’ and an entity E is projected by P just in case both P and 
P entails that E exists.
42. Cf. O’Connor 1991 for an argument that this can be done with predi-
cations involving contingent divine volitions, and cf. Brower forthcoming 
and Pruss 2003 for arguments that this can be done with predications of both 
types. For a diﬀ erent sort of response to this objection, cf. Stump 2003.
43. Cf. e.g., Aquinas’s discussion in Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 19, a. 3.
44. See Armstrong 1989 and 1997.
45. See Armstrong 1989, esp. pp. 116–19. For a more complete develop-
ment and defense of this view, see Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1989.
46. Cf., e.g., the following remarks of Aquinas:
It is not necessary that if this is a man and that is a man, then they both 
have numerically the same humanity, any more than two white things 
have numerically the same whiteness; but it is necessary that the one be 
similar to the other in that it has a humanity just as the other does. It is 
for this reason that the intellect, considering humanity not as belonging 
to this thing, but as humanity, forms a concept that is common to all. 
(Scriptum super libros Sententiarum II, d. 17, q.1, a.1)
47. If it is asked in virtue of what Socrates’ justice and God’s justice (or bet-
ter, God himself) resemble, the answer will be of the same general sort that is 
usually oﬀ ered by trope-nominalists. They resemble just in virtue of being the 
concrete individuals they are. End of story.
48. Cf. Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 13, aa. 4–5, where the fact that such diﬀ erent 
types of entity can plausibly be said to play this role leads Aquinas to conclude 
that predicates such as ‘just’ apply to God and creatures only analogously.
49. See MacDonald 1990 for relevant texts and discussion.
50. These sorts of considerations lead Aquinas to say that, strictly speak-
ing, there is no potentiality in God, but only actuality.
51. Perhaps the chief threat to truthmaker theory comes from the so-called 
Slingshot argument, which purports to establish the emptiness or uselessness 
of the notion of truthmaking. For discussion of this argument, as well as a 
response on behalf of truthmakers, see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2001.
52. I am grateful to Michael Bergmann, Thomas Crisp, Thomas Flint, Wil-
liam Hasker, Joshua Hochschild, Patrick Kain, Gyula Klima, Brian Left ow, 
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Wesley Morriston, Alvin Plantinga, Alexander Pruss, Michael Rea, Kath-
erin Rogers, Brian Shanley, Jim Stone, Paul Studtmann, several anonymous 
referees, and especially Susan Brower-Toland for discussion and comments on 
earlier versions of this paper. Research at the early stages of this paper was sup-
ported by a grant from Notre Dame’s Center for Philosophy of Religion, which 
is hereby gratefully acknowledged. Ancestors of the paper were given at the 
Center for Philosophy of Religion Colloquium in 1999, and the Cornell Sum-
mer Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy in 1999. I am indebted to members of 
the audiences on those occasions for stimulating comments and criticism.
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